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The Universality Challenge and
the Resurrection of
Evidentialism

The universality challenge is this: since the experiences that gen
erate theistic beliefs are shared by theist and nontheist alike, Plan
tinga must explain why only theists generate theistic beliefs
whereas (nearly) everyone generates the nontheistic, perceptual
paradigm beliefs. I consider several possible responses to this chal
lenge here. The first three of these fail to provide aid to Plantinga.
In the last several sections I present and discuss a response which,
although successful, leads to the resurrection of evidentialism and
the evidentialist objection to theistic belief.
I.

A First Response to the Universality Challenge

To respond successfully to the universality challenge one must
provide an account of experience and belief formation such that
both theist and nontheist can share the experience but which allows
the theist alone to form a theistic belief that is properly basic. Is it
enough to generate the challenge if there is a common core to the
experience that both theist and nontheist share? Two "common
core" cases can be suggested. Both theist and nontheist can admit,
for example, that they are awed by the universe, that the flower is
beautiful, or that the Bible is profound. But the theist can then
either claim to interpret the experience differently from the non
theist or claim to experience something more, a divine awe, a di-
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vine beauty, or a divine profundity. In either case, the experience
leading the believers to different beliefs could be said to be shared
only insofar as there is a common aspect or part of the experience.
The first case does not help Plantinga, for although there is a com
mon core of experience, there is an interpretation added to it. Pre
sumably this is inferential and we are no longer considering a prop
erly basic belief. In the second case-in which, for example, both
theist and nontheist experience the common core of "awe at the
universe" but the theist also experiences "the hand of God"
alongside the common core-the aspect of the experience that is
not common is the theistic part. But the theistic aspect of the expe
rience, insofar as it is theistic and unshared, falls under the censure
of challenges already discussed. Insofar as what is not common in
the experiences constitutes an additional unshared experience, the
universality challenge is not even applicable. At best the case falls
under the background belief challenge to direct experiences of
God, and at worst the case is irrelevant to Plantinga's goals.
2. A Second Response to the Challenge
A more promising line is suggested by the notion of superve
nience. Two examples spell out the account. First, it is widely held
that moral facts are supervenient on physical facts. W. D. Hudson
provides an intuitive account of supervenience: "You would puzzle
your hearers if you said that two things, A and B, are alike in
every respect except that A is good and B is not; or if you said that
two actions, C and D, were exactly the same except that C was
right, or obligatory, and D was not. They would insist that there
must be some other difference to account for this one. "' This
"some other difference" is often taken to be a difference in physical
fact. For instance, if two cases of a knife being raised above a child
and then plunged into his flesh are not both to count as murder,
there must be a physical difference in the two cases; perhaps one is
done in the context of the operating room but the other is not. The
difference may also be one of intention, so, for example, the per
son raising the knife intends to murder the unfortunate recipient.
I. W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1970), pp. !64-65 .
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Rationality and Theistic Belief

According to this position there is no difficulty in claiming that
moral beliefs are objectively true or false and epistemically justifia
ble even though the moral facts making them true supervene on
physical facts. Further, it is consistent with this position that there
be two people, both of whom have exactly the same experience of
the physical facts but one of whom does not form the same moral
belief as the other. This second person, indeed, does not form any
moral beliefs at all. Ethicists sometimes call such a person
"amoral. " Here we have a case in which the experience of both
persons is the same-they experience the same physical events or
things-but in which one is led in quite a different direction in
terms of belief. One requirement for a counterexample is met: the
experience is the same.
But there is a second requirement for a counterexample: the be
liefs must not only be generated from the same experience but
must also be properly basic. Are moral beliefs properly basic? It
seems clear enough that moral beliefs are neither reducible to phys
ical beliefs nor inferred from them. Yet they are typically treated as
justified. Thus, it seems plausible enough that some moral beliefs
are properly basic, and if so the second requirement for a counter
example is met.
But some may suggest that the claim that moral beliefs are prop
erly basic is arguable, and perhaps a nonmoral example is best.
John Rawls, in "Two Concepts of Rules, " writes: "Many of the
actions one performs in a game of baseball one can do by oneself
or with others whether there is the game or not. For example, one
can throw a ball, run, or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood.
But one can not steal base, or strike out, or draw a walk, or make an
error, or balk; although one can do certain things which appear to
resemble these actions such as sliding into a bag, missing a grounder
and so on. Striking out, stealing a base, balking, etc., are all actions
which can only happen in a game. "2 There are new facts brought into
existence by the practice of baseball. There would be no such thing as
stealing second base were it not for the game of baseball. Baseball
facts are supervenient on physical facts; stealing second base is super
venient on a person running from one sandbag to another.
2. John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," in Ethics, ed. Judith J. Thomson and
Gerald Dworkin (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 1 28.
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Now, suppose that I am ignorant of baseball and its rules but
you are not. As we sit to watch the game, we both have the same
experience of the physical facts. We both see some person running
from one bag to another. You form the belief that the runner just
stole second base; I do not. Furthermore, your belief that the run
ner stole second base is quite plausibly properly basic. Here we
have a counterexample that appears to meet both criteria for suc
cess. The believers both share the same experience, but one is led
to a belief that is properly basic and the other person is not.
The supervenience account applies to the theistic case in this
way. First, the theist and nontheist both have the same experi
ence-being awed by the beauty of the universe. Second, the theis
tic facts are supervenient on the physical (or aesthetic) facts. The
theist is led to a theistic belief, the nontheist is not, just as the
morally aware person and the person who knows baseball are led
to moral and baseball beliefs, whereas the amoral person and the
person ignorant of baseball are not led to moral or baseball beliefs.
We have then allowed for the areligious (or atheistic) person, one
who simply does not see the religious point of view, and the chal
lenge appears to be met on its own grounds. There is a shared
experience along with the generation of a nonuniversal but prop
erly basic belief.
So the universality challenge appears to be met. But we need to
look more closely here. First of all, there probably is no separate
epistemic "baseball practice. " Where beliefs about supervenient
facts are generated, I suggest, the generation is because of the
larger belief practices we all share. The difference appears to be that
the non-baseball believer fails to have certain concepts the baseball
believer has. Thus the supervenience cases seem to provide a prima
facie counterexample to the egalitarian assumption lying behind
the universality challenge. But I do not believe these cases provide
true counterexamples. Apparently not everyone sharing the same
experience will generate the same belief. As noted, some people
grasp concepts that others do not. But this is not to say that their
conceptual schemes are fundamentally different or, for that matter,
that their belief-forming practices are fundamentally different.
Surely we all have the ability to generate beliefs about supervenient
facts. Nevertheless, we need to explain the nonuniversality of be
lief formation about supervenient facts. I believe the best explana-
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tion is that not all people share the same concepts (although they do
all share roughly the same conceptual scheme) . This failure to have
certain concepts is a pragmatic failure, however, and thus, as in
Alston's case of the practice of pure mathematics, it does not indi
cate that we should be epistemically suspicious of the practice it
self.
Does this work for theistic belief formation? Can theistic beliefs
be understood as beliefs about supervenient facts? One might sug
gest that the nontheist is epistemically deficient in just the way the
non-baseball believer is: she lacks theistic concepts. The problem
here is that many nontheists apparently have the requisite theistic
concepts. How one is to explain the lack of theistic belief genera
tion in their case is difficult. These observations suggest that we
need to look elsewhere to explain the nonuniversality of theistic
belief formation.
Furthermore, even if the supervenience cases do meet the uni
versality challenge, for the theist the supervenience approach qua
supervenience is an unwise direction in which to seek solace. The
problem arising with understanding theistic facts to be superve
nient on natural facts is one of ontology. According to the gener
ally accepted account of supervenience, (significant) change in the
physical facts leads to change in the supervenient facts. And if there
is a change in the supervenient facts, there must be a corresponding
change in the physical facts. As far, then, as the ontology of the
matter goes, the supervenient facts are inextricably related to the
physical facts. In the supervenience account of moral facts, for ex
ample, the moral state of affairs, although not reducible to the
physical state of affairs, would have no ontological status without
the physical state of affairs. And a stealing of second base would
never occur if no one ran around a diamond-shaped field touching
sandbags.
So it would be in the religious case. If the experience shared by
the theist and nontheist were of the same natural facts, and the
theistic facts supervened on those natural facts, then the theistic
facts would be inextricably bound up with the natural facts. But in
the commonly accepted picture of theism, God is ontologically in
dependent of the physical world. That facts about God are super
venient on physical facts presents us with an ontologically inferior
God, an unhappy state of affairs for the Christian theist and hence
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for Plantinga. At best this account allows a type of pantheistic God
whose ontological status is not independent of the physical uni
verse.
Thus, although there may be counterexamples to the underlying
claims of the universality challenge (and even this I am not willing
to admit), they are not of a variety that rescues Plantinga's parity
thesis from the grip of the challenge. To make this point explicit
one need only consider the following modification of the chal
lenge. Instead of "all properly basic beliefs are universal" being the
central claim of the challenge, it can be replaced by "all properly
basic beliefs about nonsupervenient facts are universal. " Since
theistic beliefs are not about supervenient facts, they must be uni
versally formed. The challenge is not yet met. One must show
how theistic beliefs can be nonuniversal and yet properly basic. 3

3. A Third Response to the Challenge
A final possible but unsuccessful response to the challenge relies
on the notion of a gestalt shift. Two analogies to the theistic case
bring out this possibility. 4 First, suppose I have a defect in my eyes
so that I see only the dots on a surface covered with red and white
dots. You, and everyone else without this peculiar defect, see a
pink surface. Your experience, then, is infused with pinkness.
There is a gestalt shift that I simply do not make. Thus we both see
3· Hidden in these comments may be the beginning of a way to avoid certain
difficulties with the egalitarian assumption. Perhaps the practices surrounding su
pervenient beliefs are not universal, as the egalitarian assumption suggests, and
perhaps this is because of background beliefs. There are, in fact, many cases each
day of perceivers having the same experience but not generating the same beliefs.
Perhaps some of these happen because of supervenience conditions that involve
background beliefs, and perhaps others are not supervenience cases but still involve
background beliefs-like the Tim and Tom Tibbetts case of identifying twins. But
recall that the universality challenge, supported by the egalitarian assumption, is
concerned with beliefs formed in an immediate way-unlike the Tim and Tom
Tibbetts case. If there is a way background beliefs can play a noninferential role in
belief formation, perhaps a reply to the universality challenge can be developed. I
explore issues related to these suggestions in the following chapter.
4· I have Francis W. Dauer to thank for these examples. He was also helpful in
my thinking about the issue of supervenience. The suggestion that a supervenience
understanding of religious experience provides only for an ontologically inferior
God is his.
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something different and form different beliefs. Can we both be
said to experience the same thing?
Two suggestions are available. On the one hand, one might ar
gue that there is a common core to our experience-the white and
red dots. In fact, if you pay very close attention to the surface, you
too see the red and white dots. Nevertheless, it seems that the ex
periences that generate the corresponding beliefs are phenome
nologically quite different. You will not generate the pink surface
belief unless you have the phenomenological experience of pink
ness. And unless you make a special effort, your experience is one
of being appeared to pinkly whereas mine is one of being appeared
to dottedly. Our experiences are thus quite different. On the other
hand, suppose your experience is so infused with pinkness that you
simply cannot see the dots no matter how close you get to the
surface. In this case, we do not at all share the same experience. In
either case, the analogy does not suffice to reply to the universality
challenge.
Second, suppose you and I are at the symphony. You hear only
a succession of musical notes played by the orchestra whereas I
hear a melancholy melody. It is implausible that we both have the
same core of experience but that I experience something more.
Our experiences are the same: we both seem to hear the musical
notes. Yet our beliefs are quite different. Further, I do not hear the
melancholiness of the music above and beyond the musical notes
or form the belief about the melancholy melody by inference.
There are two ways of understanding this example, neither of
which provides much ammunition against the universality chal
lenge. First, the melancholy melody may be understood as a qual
ity or feature that supervenes on the pattern of musical notes. This
interpretation does not provide an alternative to the conclusion
reached about supervenience earlier. Second, the experience I have
of the melody may be explained by a type of gestalt shift, as in the
former case in which one sees pink where there are, in fact, only
red and white dots. Thus, just as in the former case in which you
are appeared to pinkly, in this case I am appeared to in a melan
choly-like manner. This understanding of the case challenges the
claim that our experiences are the same, putting it on no better
footing than the pink-surface case in which the perceivers have two
different experiences.
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Of the two interpretations, the second seems the weaker, for
there appears to be a difference between the dot case and the mel
ody case. In the red and white dot case, the belief that one sees a
pink surface is tied to the phenomenological content of being ap
peared to pinkly. To see the surface as covered with red and white
dots, one presumably must "shake off'' the apparently pink phe
nomenological experience. One must replace, so to speak, one ex
periential content with another. But in the melody case I do not
have to shake off the apparent melancholiness in order to hear the
musical notes. Somehow the melancholiness rests in the musical
notes, and I hear both, which is not to say that there is no phe
nomenological difference between hearing the music as melancholy
and not.
The argument here does not, fortunately, rest on our making a
choice between the alternative interpretations. Whether one takes
the supervenience interpretation or the gestalt interpretation, the
example does not help Plantinga reply to the universality chal
lenge. He must turn elsewhere.

4· Exaggerated Alstonian Epistemic Practice
As we saw in Chapter 2, Alston suggests that one way to avoid
the difficulties with the bifurcation of belief formation into experi
ence and explanation is to understand belief formation in terms of
what he calls objectification. He uses the term "objectify" to stand
for "taking a certain kind of experience as an experience of some
thing of a certain sort. " In the physical object case, we take percep
tual experiences as experiences of physical objects (rather than psy
chological data) . He suggests, then, that just as we form physical
object beliefs directly on the basis of perception, so we form theis
tic beliefs directly on the basis of theistic experience.
Recall the suggestion that the "certain range of experience" ob
jectified by CP must have, on Alston's own grounds, a theistic
content not, presumably, experienced by the nontheist. As in the
case of PP, in which there appears to be a link between how the
experiencer would describe the experience and the belief generated
by it-a lingo-conceptual link-so it is with CP. It is here that PTA
falls prey to the background belief challenge that relies on the dis
tinction between conceptual reading and noninferential mediated
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beliefs, for the latter seem more weakly justified than the former.
For a theistic belief to be formed, given Alston's account of direct
experiences of God, the generation of the belief must rely on back
ground beliefs as opposed to a mere conceptual scheme.
In Plantinga's case, however, I suggest an even stronger reliance
on background beliefs, for with his generation of theistic beliefs the
experience and the belief generated through it are not linked in the
lingo-conceptual manner suggested with regard to Alston's posi
tion. Hence, there is nothing in the experience alone that even
hints at a theistic belief. The theistic content of the generated belief
appears to derive solely from the background beliefs. I suggest, in
other words, that Plantinga could not simply adopt Alston's ac
count of CP but could use only a modified, exaggerated version.
This, in turn, brings the necessity of justification for the back
ground beliefs into clear focus.
It is possible that the theist's objectification of certain experiences
in theistic terms does not rely on a lingo-conceptual link or a re
lated underlying theistic experience as suggested by Alston's ac
count. Although objectification of an experience in physical con
cepts perhaps must rely on an experience that is describable in
physical object language, in the exaggerated practice I am suggest
ing, objectification of an experience in theistic concepts does not
demand the possibility of a description of the experience in theistic
object language. Rather, background beliefs may allow the theist
to objectify any perceptual (or aesthetic or moral, etc.) experience
into theistic language and beliefs. The reason some do not objectify
their experiences in this way is just that not everyone shares the
same set of background beliefs. 5 We all objectify perceptual beliefs
in terms of physical object language because we all share the physi
cal object conceptual scheme. We do not all share the theistic back
ground beliefs. 6
5. Here I call attention to the fact that the objectification must be noninferen
tial. If it were otherwise, the resulting belief would not be basic and the case would
not be significantly different from an interpretive common core type of experience
and belief formation suggested in Section 3.
6. Someone might raise an egalitarian-assumption question about this whole
idea. This exaggerated CP does not solve the universality challenge, the critic
might say, since it does not meet the egalitarian assumption driving the univer
sality challenge. The reply to this suggestion is that the egalitarian assumption
that everyone has (roughly) the same epistemic practices and hence given the same
input will generate the same beliefs-does not come into play here. It associates a
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Consider the following examples analogous to this kind of theis
tic objectification. Suppose .Letitia recently married and one after
noon on coming home finds her spouse, Jack, away. He left sev
eral clues as to his whereabouts. She discovers that his truck is still
in the laneway, but his bush boots are missing. Further, she notes
that Jack's favorite foods are missing from the pantry. Finally, Let
itia finds a note in Jack's handwriting stating that he has gone to
the bush. Letitia makes the inference and forms the belief that Jack
has gone to the bush. All kinds of beliefs come into play, and she
reasons to the conclusion that Jack has gone to the bush. Here the
belief is clearly not basic, it is inferred. Suppose, after a lengthy
marriage, however, that Letitia comes to know Jack very well. As
she comes in the door, Letitia notices Jack's bush boots missing
from the normal spot. She immediately forms the belief that Jack
has gone to the bush. In these circumstances the belief depends on
a complex set of (background) beliefs about Letitia's husband-he
acts in thus and so ways, for example, he only uses his bush boots
for trips to the bush-but Letitia does not reason to it. Such a
belief formation seems more than plausible; in fact, we form beliefs
in like manner many times each day. When we are very familiar
with circumstances and hold the relevant background beliefs, we
do not reason to the belief we form; we form it immediately. Fur
thermore, there appears to be no lingo-conceptual link, or at least
the same kind of link, between the experience of the boots being
missing and the belief that Jack has gone to the bush. 7 The belief
certain kind of content, say, physical object content, with a certain kind of belie£
In the case of PP, for example, physical object experiential content generates, via
the physical object conceptual scheme, physical object beliefs. The egalitarian as
sumption does not just claim that everyone forms the same beliefs given the same
input, but also that everyone has roughly the same practices and conceptual
schemes available to them. Presumably the same (kind of) practice is available to
everyone, as the examples that follow in the text indicate, but the practice is so
widely variant in its application that just about any experience can generate just
about any belie£ The difference between the beliefs one person forms as opposed
to another are not because of a different practice or different concepts but because
the application of the practice depends on one's background beliefs (and not merely
a conceptual scheme).

7. I say there is not a lingo-conceptual link, but there may be some kind of link
between the experience of the missing boots and the belief that Jack has gone to the
bush. There may be a link as well between experiencing a beautiful flower and the
belief that God created it. But in neither case is it the same kind of link as that
between "I see a tree" and "being appeared to treely." When I believe "I see a
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formed is not about the boots' being missing but about Jack. Nev
ertheless, such a belief is basic, since Letitia does not infer it.
That this example would be acceptable to Plantinga can be de
fended in the following manner. Plantinga writes that "a belief can
easily change status from nonbasic to basic and vice versa. "8 His
example is that I may now believe that 21 X 21
441 on the basis
of calculation but later I merely remember it. It is at first nonbasic
but later basic. He also claims that self-evidence is relative to per
sons, and thus that what is self-evident to you may not be to me. It
can therefore be suggested that what is at first nonbasic because not
self-evident may later become basic because it becomes self-evi
dent. For example, I may come to believe that 256 + 327
583
only by calculating it, but later, if I am particularly talented at
arithmetic, I may just "see" that 256 + 327
583. It is not that I
merely remember that 256 + 327
583. Rather, I have become so
adept with arithmetic that I know that 256 + 327
583 much like
I know that 2 + 3
5· What is self-evident to the learned is not
necessarily self-evident to the unlearned. We form all types of be
liefs without reasoning to them, and, although it might be argued
that we reason subconsciously that 256 + 327
583 or that my
husband has gone hiking, this seems to be little more than an ad
hoc defense. So, for Plantinga, a beliefs being basic for a person
seems to come to little more than the fact that the person has not
inferred it; it is a psychological fact about that person. If it is in
ferred, it is nonbasic; if not, then basic.
Furthermore, it appears that a belief formed in the context of
other background beliefs can be basic even when that belief was
once inferred from the background beliefs. Plantinga says simply
that for a belief to be basic one must not hold it because one in
ferred it by discursive reasoning; that is, one must not hold it on
the basis of other beliefs, one must not consciously infer it from
those beliefs. In the case of the wandering spouse and the bush
boots imagined above, Letitia does not believe on the basis of evi=
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=

=

=

tree, " I also admit, when questioned, the truth of "I am being appeared to treely";
but Letitia need not admit the truth of "I am being appeared to missing-bootedly"
whenever she has the belief "Jack has gone to the bush. " Neither is it the case that I
always admit to the truth of "I am appeared to beautiful-flowerly" when I believe
"God created the flower. "
8. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 50.
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dence that her husband has gone hiking, if what is meant by evi
dence is that she inferred from some of her other beliefs that Jack
went hiking. Letitia did not infer anything at all. It is simply a
matter of fact that some beliefs require, for their formation, a com
plicated set of background beliefs, and yet beliefs formed against
that complicated background can be basic. She merely objectifies
her experience in terms of Jack's having gone hiking.
In cases such as Letitia's, not everyone who has the same experi
ences will form the same beliefs. I may experience the spot where
the bush boots should be as empty and not form any belief at all
about Jack. What we have here is a noninferential mediated epi
stemic practice with a twist. The beliefs in question are generated
in the context of experiences and sets of background beliefs in
which the burden of the work is on the background beliefs. By
breaking the lingo-conceptual link between the experience and the
generated belief I have, in effect, moved the role of the experience
away from a justificatory toward a genetic position. The experi
ences are much more the occasion for the belief generations, and
their content is less important epistemically. 9
How do these suggestions and examples help with the univer
sality challenge to PTJ,1? First, the suggestion allows the theist to
have exactly the same experience as the nontheist. We both experi
ence the same flower and the same beauty (and in a parallel fashion
the same lack of bush boots). Second, it begins to explain, al
though admittedly in an extremely cursory fashion, how the theis
tic belief comes to be held. It is not inferred and hence it is basic. 10 I
do not infer from the flower's beauty that God created it anymore
than Letitia infers from the missing bush boots that Jack has gone
to the bush. The experience initiates a complex, noninferential be
lief-forming process that leaves me with the belief, an objectifica
tion of the experience in theistic language. Third, the experience
need not lead to the same belief for everyone. Both of us may see
9. Perhaps this could be understood as a kind of holistic justification rather
than a foundational one, or at least a justification with a strong holist component. I
return to this suggestion in the final three chapters.
IO.

Here one should compare note

9 and the account Plantinga gives of co

herentism in "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God," p.
125, in which he argues that coherentism is really a kind of foundationalism where
all justified beliefs are foundational.
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the beautiful flower but only one of us be led to believe that God
created it, just as we may both experience the lack of bush boots
but only one of us be led to the belief that Jack has gone to the
bush. It seems, then, that there is a least one possible solution to
the universality challenge.
s. Evidentialism and the Intuitive Results

Although the exaggerated Alstonian response appears to supply
the features needed for a reply to the universality challenge, the
response is not without its difficulties. These have to do with the
thrust behind evidentialism, and thus a brief review of evidential
ism's tenets may be helpful.
Evidentialism, recall, is the view that claims the following:
(1*) There are obligations, standards of excellence, or (other)
normative patterns to follow with respect to belief that,
when followed, provide permissive justification for belief.
(2*) It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective
for anyone to believe, on insufficient evidence, any belief
requiring discursive justification.
(3*) Since belief in God requires discursive justification, it is
irrational, unreasonable, or unjustified to accept theistic
belief in the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons.
The evidentialist objector holds (1*), (2*), and (3*) along with this
denial:

(4) We have no evidence, or at any rate not sufficient evi
dence, for the proposition that God exists.
Plantinga, recall, rejects not only (4) but (3*) as well.
One central motivation behind the evidentialist understanding of
justification is the desire to avoid arbitrariness in what should be
taken as justified. Not just any belief should be taken as justified;
there must be some good reason or ground. Plantinga himself fol
lows this general spirit when he rejects the Great Pumpkin objec
tion as not applying to his theory. But the evidentialist objector
goes one step beyond merely requiring grounds and requires dis-
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cursive grounds for belief in God. Since it has no discursive
grounds, the objector says, belief in God is arbitrary and hence not
justified. Plantinga denies that it must have discursive grounding.
According to Plantinga, foundationalism is the theoretical sup
port for evidentialism. The historical motivation behind the foun
dationalist account of justification is the search for some means of
tying our beliefs to the independently existing world. The motiva
tion is a drive toward a guarantee of truth, the avoidance of arbi
trariness. But more recent foundational accounts, Plantinga's in
cluded, are not quite so bold. They do not seek such a guarantee.
Nevertheless, the closer the foundational beliefs are to providing
the link to the independent world, the more likely it is that the
belief system built on those foundations is not arbitrary. We can
sum up the thrust of the foundationalist/evidentialist platform with
the claim that both attempt to avoid arbitrariness with respect to
justified belief. Insofar as Plantinga strives to remain a founda
tionalist, we can understand his goal to be to escape the arbitrari
ness evidentialism seeks to avoid. 1 1
But the spirit of the evidentialist seems to haunt the halls of the
foundationalist mansion Plantinga builds for us. Doing away with
classical foundationalism is not sufficient to do away with eviden
tialism, or at least its central thrust. If the reply to the universality
challenge provided in the earlier parts of this chapter is a represen
tative account of how Plantinga must reply to the challenge, the
evidentialist is surely going to press the arbitrariness charge against
Plantinga's position. Three problems immediately come to mind.
First, the account allows virtually any experience to be objec
tified into theistic language and belief, since there is no mandatory
lingo-conceptual link between the experience or its content and the
belief formed. An experience of any event, object, or person po
tentially leads to a theistic belief. Now, Plantinga himself denies
that just any belief can be legitimately taken as properly basic.
Properly basic beliefs are formed in certain kinds of difficult-to
specify but nonarbitrary conditions. But he fails to spell out these
conditions, and the pressure brought to bear against the parity
thesis by the universality challenge questions the likelihood that
1 r. Plantinga does admit to a kind of polemical relativism but does not seem to
take this result to be of great importance.
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Plantinga can spell out any conditions that rule out arbitrary beliefs.
His claim that not just any belief can be legitimately formed seems
somewhat idle.
Second, the background beliefs that allow the objectification of
any experience into theistic language and belief are extremely indi
vidualized. Consider the following analogous case. Suppose some
person, Norm, is not at all attentive to the amount of milk left in
the refrigerator. Frequently his wife asks him to bring milk home,
but he, being distracted by another hundred details in his life, fails
almost as frequently to bring milk home. After being chastised
many times for his failings, Norm begins to connect the experience
of driving past Mike's Milk Store, and seeing the sculpted plastic
milk jug in the front, to the belief that he should bring milk home.
At first Norm has to use his seeing the sculpted plastic milk jug
as a cue to his memory, not as to whether he was asked to bring
milk home but rather to what belief his seeing the jug is to be
connected to. He must, therefore, reason along the following lines:
"That jug is supposed to remind me of something. What is it? Oh,
yes. It's a milk jug. Why a milk jug? Probably has to do with milk.
Oh, yes. I remember. I should bring milk home. " But after a while
Norm does not reason this way. He simply sees the sculpted milk
jug and forms the belief "I should bring milk home. " Here it is not
Norm's memory at work but rather an idiosyncratic belief-form
ing mechanism.
Whatever goes on in Norm's mind, it seems so conditioned by
his unique background and experience that a criticism of the justi
fication of the belief may be impossible by someone who does not
have the same background or experience. It might just as well have
been an experience of a telephone or automobile that triggered the
belief that Norm should bring milk home. The lack of common
ality among background beliefs suggests a minimal likelihood of
common ground for an evaluation of the justification of the belief.
In other words, the general drift of the exaggerated Alstonian ac
count suggests that such an individualized picture of the ground of
belief formation makes it highly unlikely that we can ever agree on
a set of criteria for justification. Plantinga admits that there may be
no generally shared set of criteria when he suggests an inductive
procedure to discover it. He even suggests that the criteria will not
be polemically useful in coming to agreement on the grounds for
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justification, at least across theistic-nontheistic lines. But this ad
mission seems only to indicate the need for wariness. If Plantinga's
only defense against the universality challenge is the exaggerated
Alstonian defense, then extreme caution is suggested, for on that
account even if there is a community to which one can appeal for
shared examples of proper basicality (in the sense, say, of a Chris
tian community) there is no guarantee that everyone in that com
munity uses the same or even similar sets of background belief in
their generation of theistic beliefs. This may be a more radical re
sult than one with which Plantinga is willing to live.
Finally, the plausibility that the belief "Jack has gone to the
bush" is properly basic seems to derive from the fact that Letitia
once reasoned to the belief. When she does not reason to it, what
justifies it? Is there some experience that provides justification?
One is tempted to suggest, following the spirit of the evidentialist,
that if her belief is ever to be justified it must, at least somewhere
back in her personal epistemic history, have been inferred. If this is
so, the notion of a belief being basic may come to no more than an
account of one's own psychology, and we can discover the ba
sicality of beliefs merely by conducting an empirical survey. "Did
you infer the belief consciously on this occasion?" "No. " "Then it
is basic. " But thus far this has nothing to do with the propriety of
the belief. On what grounds is a belief such as "Jack has gone to
the bush" taken to be proper? Without some discursive grounds, it
seems quite likely that it is not proper. So far, the account given
only provides us basicality but not propriety.
The exaggerated Alstonian view suggests that the background
beliefs enable the objectification of experience into belief. Thus
these beliefs are important. Following through with the example,
it is natural to suggest that the role these beliefs play is something
like this. What justifies the belief "Jack has gone to the bush" is
that if Letitia's background beliefs were transcribed into discursive
form they would provide reasons for her belief or, when taken
together, they would provide an argument for the belief. If this is
true, whence derives the propriety of properly basic beliefs? As
suggested earlier, it appears that we can cash out being basic sim
ply in terms of not being consciously inferred. Thus, basic beliefs
may be beliefs held without discursive evidence but which must
have been discursively held in the past. If what really provides
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epistemic justification is the background beliefs or some relation
ship between the supposed basic beliefs and the background be
liefs, the evidentialist ghost begins to appear.
These issues raise the suspicion that Plantinga's theory commits
him to a type of arbitrariness insofar as he wishes to retain the
parity thesis. But suspicions are only suspicions. We now need a
more rigorous account of the problems; we need an explicit state
ment of the revitalized evidentialist challenge.

6. The Resurrection of Evidentialism
The intuitive charge against the exaggerated Alstonian apparatus
is that it results (theoretically) in any belief counting as properly
basic. There is, in short, a kind of arbitrariness that results from
Plantinga's theory. The only way Plantinga can protect his position
against the charge of arbitrariness is to return to an evidentialist
approach to theistic beliefs. 12 But to do so is to give up the parity
thesis, for perceptual paradigm beliefs are then possibly properly
basic, not needing background beliefs, whereas theistic beliefs are
not.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that there is a way a
noninferred belief is justified for a person when she has appropriate
background beliefs as in exaggerated Alstonian objectification. In
sofar as Plantinga must use the objectification approach to avoid
the universality problem, he must appeal to certain background
beliefs. What is the status of these beliefs? First, it is clear that they
have theistic content. It is hard to see how background beliefs that
make no reference to God at all can be used to objectify theistically
neutral experiences into theistic beliefs. For ease of discussion, let
us call these background beliefs "theistic* beliefs. " Theistic* beliefs
are the background beliefs needed to objectify an experience into
theistic belief, and they are fairly high-level beliefs in terms of their
theistic content. Second, theistic* beliefs stand in need ofjustifica
tion. 13 Consider the following. Suppose I arbitrarily believe (with
out justification) that there is a Great Pumpkin; I develop Great
1 2. Or, as a secondary response, to retreat to a kind of holist justification for
theistic beliefs; see Chapters Io-12.
1 3. I do not mean that I have to justify them but rather that I am justified in
them.
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Pumpkin* beliefs. Suppose further that I then begin to objectify
my everyday experiences in terms of Great Pumpkin beliefs. If I
have no justification for these background beliefs, surely my objec
tifications (although perhaps basic) are unjustified. So it is with
theistic* beliefs. These background beliefs must be justified if the
objectifications resulting from them are to result in properly basic
beliefs. The central issue is, then, how theistic* beliefs are justified.
I present several options here briefly, then return to them below.
Theistic* beliefs could be properly nonbasic, that is, they could
result from an inferential procedure. This option is not attractive to
the Reformed epistemologist; if one needs natural theology (or
some other inferential means, e. g. , inferential appeal to authority,
Scripture, or tradition) to justify the very beliefs needed to allow
for objectification, the Reformed epistemologist has only put off
the evidentialist objection one step. The other options fall within
the proper basicality camp. There is first the possibility that theis
tic* beliefs are generated by another application of theistic objec
tification; that is, at some time in the past one formed theistic be
liefs via objectification of some experience. These beliefs then
became part of one's noetic structure and are now the theistic*
beliefs used to objectify other experiences into theistic beliefs. This
option has the obvious difficulty of generating an infinite regress.
The final possible source ofjustification for theistic* beliefs is some
externalist principle. It should not surprise us that Plantinga may
need to appeal to some externalist principle, for it seems that all
versions of foundationalism ultimately appeal to externalism. 14 This
claim needs defending, however, so an argument is in order.
One can distinguish among intemalist and extemalist theories of
justification. Many foundationalists rely on an intemalist picture of
justification. They say, for example, that it does not suffice for p's
justification that it be the result of some reliable belief-forming mech
anism outside my awareness or access. The evidence I have for p
must be evidence in reach of my awareness and not merely some
causal or lawlike connection between the fact of the matter and my
14. Perhaps an internalism constrained by reliabilist requirements would do the
trick here; see Alston's version of internalism discussed in Chapter 4· The impor
tant point is that at some stage the epistemic principles allow one to be justified in
holding a belief or using a practice without also demanding that one has to justify
the belief or practice.
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holding a belief about the fact. Hence, the emphasis on (conscious)
discursive reasoning is a significant part of the justificatory procedure.
But there is a sense in which all viable versions of foundational
ism rely on externalist principles. 15 Typically this appeal to exter
nalist principles occurs for properly basic beliefs. But then, since
properly nonbasic beliefs rely on properly basic beliefs for their
justification, the whole edifice collapses without an externalist
principle (or principles) at the bottom. To see the need for exter
nalist principles, consider the following strong understanding of
internalism:
lnternalism1 : S is justified in believing p if there is some
causal or lawlike connection between p's truth and S's be
lieving p and S is justified in believing that there is such a
connection.
This account can be made more general. Where <!> is some property
that connects the truth of p to S's believing p, consider the follow
mg:
Internalism2: S is justified in believing p if p has some
property <I> and S is justified in believing it does.
This general version of internalism results fairly quickly in an infi
nite regress the foundationalist will be quick to reject.
The infinite regress is generated since on this strong kind of in
ternalism the only justified beliefs are those for which I have justi
fication for accepting the justification. Any foundational belief of
mine must have its justificatory principles justified for me. But that
justification must itself be justified, and so forth. The regress be
gins early and perhaps the only way to avoid it while holding ei
ther version of internalism is to move to a holist model ofjustifica
tion in which justification is not foundational. Thus, this version of
internalism begs the question against the foundationalist and
against the idea of proper basicality.
There must then be some externalist principle to which the
foundationalist appeals without also being required to provide jusrs. I thank Francis Dauer for helpful discussion on this point.
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tification for it. Any foundationalist must accept some externalist
principle of this form:
Externalist Principle1 : If p meets such and such (external
ist) criterion, then S is justified in believing p.
One should not add to what is required for p's justification that S
must be justified in holding to any externalist principles of the
form suggested by this principle. To do so would be to add the
strong internalist requirement that S must be justified in believing
the principle before she is justified in believing any belief it de
livers.
An example helps clarify the point. The following principle
meets the above form:
Externalist Principle2: If p is self-evident for S, S is justi
fied in believing p.
There are no epistemic requirements in the antecedent; S need not
believe or be justified in believing that p is self-evident. If this were
required, the regress would begin; for S must then be justified in
accepting the principles on which p's justification rests, and to do
that S must be justified in accepting the justification for the justi
ficatory principles themselves, and so on. One cannot have Al
ston's foil reflective justification. This second externalist principle
merely claims that, if p is self-evident for S, then S is justified in
believing it and need not be justified in holding the principle itself.
To demand a thoroughgoing internalism would be to demand too
much of the foundationalist and hence of Plantinga. All viable
foundational models must rely on some externalist principles.
Returning now to the main argument, it is clear that there must be
some source ofjustification for the needed theistic* beliefs. In light of
the externalist requirement, a brief review of the options for this
source of justification is in order, for one can now more clearly see
the folly of several of the approaches to theistic* beliefs noted above.
First is the possibility of properly nonbasic status for theistic*
beliefs. Given that there somewhere (typically at the base) needs to
be an appeal to externalist principles, one might suggest that theis
tic* beliefs result from discursive reasoning at the bottom of which
are at least some beliefs whose justification derives from externalist
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principles. These beliefs are not theistic in content; they are garden
variety beliefs about the world. This suggestion amounts to a
return to natural theology (or some other kind of inferential justi
fication procedure), but my supposition is that Plantinga qua Re
formed epistemologist cannot appeal to inferences to generate and
justify theistic* beliefs.
A second possibility is to claim that theistic* beliefs are properly
basic. Here one can claim that they might result from the exagger
ated Alstonian practice presented above; that is, theistic* beliefs
might themselves be objectifications of nontheistic experiences.
This possibility, however, has the obvious disadvantage of raising
more forcefully the question with which we began: how are theis
tic* beliefs justified given the requirement that appeal must be
made to externalist principles? The present suggestion seems only
to lead to an infinite regress we can now recognize as similar to
that which the foundationalist is attempting to overcome via the
appeal to externalist principles.
Two things seem clear. First, the justification of theistic* beliefs
must itself appeal to some externalist principle. In other words,
one cannot put off an appeal to externalist principles for some
other belief (a belief nontheistic in content) and then expect to de
rive theistic* beliefs from it. To avoid evidentialism, theistic* be
liefs must be generated out of, and justified by, some fact or expe
rience directly. Second, the justification of theistic* beliefs must be
nondiscursive. This, naturally, is part and parcel of the move to an
externalist justification for theistic* beliefs, but it is also a reminder
that natural theology or other inferential procedures are not avail
able to the Reformed epistemologist.
How then are we to understand this externalist generation and
justification of theistic* beliefs? Suppose we model our understand
ing of theistic externalist principles after the less controversial,
nontheistic varieties suggested by epistemological externalists.
Typically the suggestion is that externalist principles rely on some
causal or lawlike relation between the world and one's belief. More
specifically, one moves from an experience of the world to a belief
about the world. A person takes in cognitive input i and forms
belief p. In the typical perceptual model, i is some visual, tactile,
olfactory datum which then, following lawlike or causal principles,
generates a belief about the physical world. Further, it is important
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to remind ourselves of the lingo-conceptual link between the expe
rience and the formed belief. Earlier I suggested that the experience
leading to a physical object belief is typically described by borrow
ing from physical object language; for instance, the experience
generating "I see a tree" is described by "I am being appeared to
treely" (or some near relation of this language) .
The exaggerated Alstonian practice of theistic belief generation
does not have this lingo-conceptual link, at least not in every in
stance. In fact, it cannot be required to have the link insofar as one
is to have an account of theistic belief formation and justification
which answers the universality challenge. The exaggerated Alston
ian practice is a successful solution to the universality challenge
only insofar as it disconnects the content of the experience (and
hence its lingo-conceptual description) from the generated belief.
This is the case since the universality challenge suggests that from a
shared experience both theist and nontheist ought to generate the
same belief. Since they do not, an explanation is needed. The ex
planation is simply that the experience can be objectified in any
way the belief framework of the perceiver allows. There need be
no lingo-conceptual link tying experience to generated belief. The
relevance of all this is just that, since theistic* beliefs also have
theistic content, one must ask about the nature of the conditions
that generate them. Can the conditions be described completely in
nontheistic terms, or must they be described in theistic language; is
the experience nontheistic in nature or is it theistic? If the condi
tions are nontheistic, the lingo-conceptual link is lacking; in theistic
cases it is not. 16
If the experience is theistic in nature, the difficulties raised in
Chapters 2 and 3 reappear. Any account of nondiscursive epistemic
justification for theistic beliefs supposedly grounded in theistic ex
perience alone needs to recognize the role of background beliefs in
1 6. My suggestions here assume that it is legitimate to extend the claims about
the exaggerated Alstonian practice to externalism. Is this move in fact legitimate? I
believe so. For even if the externalist were to argue that the cognitive perceptual
input is reducible to certain patterns of colors or shapes, or even to certain patterns
of energy (light waves and the like), there is still at some level a description of the
input that is conceptually tied to the output, the physical object belief. With theis
tic belief formation, at least with varieties that avoid the difficulties raised by the
universality challenge, the parallel does not hold. There need not be a conceptual
link between the belief formed and the (description of the) experience.
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the generation of the beliefs. One should therefore wonder about
the epistemic value of theistic experiences taken independently of
other complex sets of beliefs-one's epistemic base or background
beliefs. The problem of noninferential mediated beliefs and prac
tices is pressed once again. In short, it is difficult to see how so
called theistic experiences can legitimately provide an increase in
epistemic justification for theistic* beliefs without reintroducing
the very question with which we began. The move from theistic
experience to theistic belief via externalist principles is question
able.
What of the case in which the lingo-conceptual link between ex
periential input and belief is lacking? Can one move by externalist
principles from some nontheistic information to a theistic* belief?
Given the universality challenge, it is hard to see how. Once again,
one can simply reintroduce the challenge at this new level, raising
the same questions of theistic* beliefs as were raised of theistic be
liefs.
Here it is relevant to consider the supposed lawlike nature of the
externalist principles. If everyone has the same (nontheistic) input,
why do we all not share the same theistic or theistic* beliefs? It is
also important to remember why theistic* beliefs were first intro
duced: the solution to the universality challenge was that we do
not all share the same background beliefs and thus do not all obj ec
tify experiences in the same way. As can readily be seen, this reply
cannot be used here, for the question now is how theistic* be
liefs-the background beliefs themselves-are justified. As we
have already seen, to appeal to further theistic* beliefs begins Plan
tinga on an infinite regress. There appears to be little promise for
an externalist justification of theistic* beliefs, at least insofar as one
uses a kind of lawlike externalism as a model.
Perhaps one can develop an alternative view of externalism not
patterned after the less controversial, nontheistic varieties put forth
by externalist epistemologists. Perhaps theistic externalism does
not rely on the typical lawlike mechanism model. Perhaps all that
is necessary for externalism is something like the following:
Externalist Principle3: If p has property <f> (that links up,
in some reliable way, p's truth with S's believing p), then
S is justified in believing p.

Rationality and Theistic Belief
the generation of the beliefs. One should therefore wonder about
the epistemic value of theistic experiences taken independently of
other complex sets of beliefs-one's epistemic base or background
beliefs. The problem of noninferential mediated beliefs and prac
tices is pressed once again. In short, it is difficult to see how so
called theistic experiences can legitimately provide an increase in
epistemic justification for theistic* beliefs without reintroducing
the very question with which we began. The move from theistic
experience to theistic belief via externalist principles is question
able.
What of the case in which the lingo-conceptual link between ex
periential input and belief is lacking? Can one move by externalist
principles from some nontheistic information to a theistic* belief?
Given the universality challenge, it is hard to see how. Once again,
one can simply reintroduce the challenge at this new level, raising
the same questions of theistic* beliefs as were raised of theistic be
liefs.
Here it is relevant to consider the supposed lawlike nature of the
externalist principles. If everyone has the same (nontheistic) input,
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also important to remember why theistic* beliefs were first intro
duced: the solution to the universality challenge was that we do
not all share the same background beliefs and thus do not all objec
tify experiences in the same way. As can readily be seen, this reply
cannot be used here, for the question now is how theistic* be
liefs-the background beliefs themselves-are justified. As we
have already seen, to appeal to further theistic* beliefs begins Plan
tioga on an infinite regress. There appears to be little promise for
an externalist justification of theistic* beliefs, at least insofar as one
uses a kind of lawlike externalism as a model.
Perhaps one can develop an alternative view of externalism not
patterned after the less controversial, nontheistic varieties put forth
by externalist epistemologists. Perhaps theistic externalism does
not rely on the typical lawlike mechanism model. Perhaps all that
is necessary for externalism is something like the following:
Externalist Principle3: If p has property <I> (that links up,
in some reliable way, p's truth with S's believing p), then
S is justified in believing p.
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Maybe, for example, <I> is simply the property of having been
formed by God in S. God does this for persons to whom he wishes
to reveal himself. Here the "mechanism" is not a natural one about
which lawlike predictions can be made. Indeed, there is no mecha
nism at all. The formation of the belief is simply a result of a sort of
divine telepathy, a supernatural action; it is God following through
on his intention to reveal himself to at least some humans. Being
God, he guarantees the truth of the belief, but he need not supply
theistic beliefs for all. His actions are not lawlike and neither is the
formation of theistic beliefs. There is nothing in us, the human
knowers, to account for any pattern in the formation of beliefs. It is
entirely God's doing. Our minds or noetic structures need not be
understood in one way or another for God to do his work. 17
The critic may reply that, although this seems possible, it does
not provide a particularly attractive account of theistic belief. Why
does God create theistic belief in some but not in others? Perhaps
sin or spiritual blindness could be introduced here. But one must
be careful to point out that the fault is not with us or with our
noetic equipment. God can overcome any obstacle we set up. The
reason God shows himself to some and not others must be a reason
God has. We are dealing with God's intentions and motivations,
not with faulty mechanisms. As long as this is understood, God
may be justified in not revealing himself to all.
The critic may continue with a second point. This is, he may
say, a strange kind of externalism. It is difficult to see, for exam
ple, how this type of externalism, if it can be so called, gives us
justified belief. For the lawlikeness of the mechanism seems to be
exactly what is attractive about externalism as an understanding of
the criteria for justified belief. It enables us to explain why so many
beliefs we typically take to be justified are held by most people.
1 7. Consider these comments of Alston, in "Concepts of Epistemic Justifica
tion," pp. 109-10: "Unlike justification, reliability of belief formation is not lim
ited to cases in which a belief is based on adequate grounds within a subject's
psychological states. A reliable mode of belief formation may work through the
subject's own knowledge and experience. Indeed it is plausible to suppose that all
of the reliable modes of belief formation available to human beings are of this sort.
But it is quite conceivable that there should be others. I might be so constituted
that beliefs about the weather tomorrow which apparently just 'pop into my mind'
out of nowhere are in fact reliably produced by a mechanism of which we know
nothing, and which does not involve the belief being based on anything."
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In reply it could be suggested that the only important thing
about externalism is that the formation of a belief, no matter how
it occurs, is reliable. Since God is the source of the beliefs, and
since he is reliable, the source is reliable. Is the predictive, lawlike
mechanism really as important as the critic suggests? Perhaps not.
Perhaps what is really important is that from within a developed
set of beliefs and experiences there is some account of how the
formation of theistic beliefs could be reliable even if they are not
lawlike. I consider such an account in some detail in Chapter 1 0, so
I suspend further commentary until then.
The avoidance of arbitrary results via an externalist formation
and justification of theistic* beliefs seems unlikely, unless we re
turn to the natural theology (or otherwise discursive) approach. In
order, then, to understand the justification of the required back
ground beliefs by externalist principles, one must understand them
as being basic but nontheistic beliefs on which the arguments of
natural theology (or some other inferential argument) must be con
structed. But this is to return Plantinga directly into the hands of
the evidentialist and perhaps into the hands of the evidentialist ob
jector. To avoid arbitrariness with Plantinga's foundationalist ac
count of justification, one must rely on evidentialism's claims.
Natural theology, discursive justification, is necessary to avoid just
any belief being taken as properly basic on strictly foundationalist
grounds.
Plantinga's parity thesis fails because it does not take into ac
count the role of background beliefs in the formation and justifica
tion of theistic beliefs. His position, however, appears to be more
precarious than Alston's since Plantinga seems to need an exagger
ated Alstonian approach to explain why we do not all form the
same beliefs given the same input. But this approach leaves Plan
tinga's position open to arbitrariness which, in turn, demands a
return to some type of discursive provision of evidence. In the next
chapter I consider whether Alston's position is really any stronger
and explain why Alston himself finally moves away from the par
ity thesis.

